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Internet Regulation and Consumer
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by
JOHN E. LOPATKA* and WILLIAM H. PAGE**
Introduction
The goal of telecommunications policy has shifted from the
control of natural monopoly to the promotion of competition.' But
the question remains how extensive and persistent the government's
regulatory role should be in the operation of communications
markets. One might think that regulators could find the answer to
this question in antitrust law. But antitrust has itself been torn
between interventionist and laissez-faire tendencies 2 Over the past
two decades, the dominant Chicago School approach to antitrust has
focused on economic efficiency, a standard that has led to the
abandonment or contraction of some categories of liability. More
recently, however, post-Chicago theorists have suggested that the
particular characteristics of the "new economy," particularly the
economics of networks, justify a more interventionist approach. As it
happens, telecommunications lies at the heart of the new economy.
Couching the inquiry in antitrust terms, therefore, does not resolve
the critical policy issues.
* Alumni Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law,
lopatka@law.sc.edu.
**Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar, University of Florida College of Law,
page@law.ufl.edu.
We thank Michael Vita for his helpful comments on a prior draft and Kenneth
Hinson for his outstanding research assistance.
1. Glen 0. Robinson, Regulating the Internet, 8, available at
http://www.legalessays.com (1999).
2. See generally William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of Antitrust
Policy, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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These issues have come to the fore in the dispute over regulation
of broadband Internet access. The Internet is sometimes viewed as a
world of laissez-faire, largely distinct from the established regime of
telecommunications and mass media regulation.3 For historical and
political reasons, the same standards of content and economic
regulation that apply to other media have not been extended to
Internet communications. But the contradictions that this dichotomy
raises have been unavoidable in the broadband context.4
A consumer today who wants a residential, high-speed
("broadband") Internet connection typically has at best a choice
between two, roughly comparable media: a cable modem and a
special telephone line, called a "digital subscriber line" (DSL). These
media, or data transmission pipes, are not universally deployed, and
some consumers have only one or neither available.5 If a consumer
does not have the option of a high-speed connection or if he does not
value the unique advantages of the connection enough to pay for
them, his alternative is a low-speed, narrowband connection over
standard phone lines and a dial-up modem. But regardless of the
nature of the medium employed, the consumer also needs services,
such as those provided by AOL, to access content publicly available
on the Internet. There are over 6,000 Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) that supply narrowband Internet services, but only a little
more than 100 that offer broadband services.6
Because federal law treats incumbent local telephone companies
as common carriers, any ISP that wants to offer subscribers
broadband services over a phone company's DSLs has the right to
obtain transmission services from the company at a wholesale rate
3. Joshua I. Katz, Broadband Internet Access: AT&T's Fight to Keep Its Cable Wires
"Closed," 6 B.U. J. Sc. & TECH. L. 17,17 (2000).
4. See generally Robinson, supra note 1.
5. As the FCC recently observed, "As with any technology, particularly in its early
stages, deployment of advanced telecommunications capability is not uniform across the
nation. Some consumers will gain access to that capability before others." Inquiry
Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second
Report, F.C.C.R. 20913 (Aug. 21, 2000), 2000 FCC LEXIS 4411 [hereinafter Second
Report].
6. See Internet Service Providers, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EMERGING INDUSTRIES 361
(Susan J. Cindric ed., 2000) (estimating the number of narrowband ISPs); Deployment of
Advanced Telecommunications Capability: Second Report B-2 (FCC Aug. 2000),
http://www.fcc.gov/broadband (listing number of broadband ISPs); BroadbandWeek.com,
Directory of Broadband Service Providers, http://www.broadbandweek.com/
directory/service/htm (last visited Mar. 22,2001).
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and to resell it to subscribers in conjunction with Internet services.7
Thus, a subscriber potentially could select one of several ISPs for
broadband service through a given DSL connection. Not so for
service through a cable modem. Cable companies, which typically
have local cable television service monopolies, have combined the
Internet services and broadband transmission functions and offer only
a package of the two components. As a result, the subscriber must
use the services of the cable company's proprietary ISP. Of course, if
cable broadband were to become dominant, this practice would
threaten the existence of independent ISPs.
The cable industry's practice of bundling high-speed transmission
and Internet services has come under fire from both ISPs and
analysts. Some commentators have called upon the Federal
Communications Commission to require cable companies to provide
open access, allowing any ISP to provide service to the cable
company's subscribers.8 In effect, such requirements would force
cable companies to sell broadband transmission services separately.
The FCC has so far resisted these overtures, but it is reconsidering its
position. 9 Some local governments have enacted ordinances imposing
open access mandates on their cable franchisees, though the laws
have not fared well in the courts.10 Bundling has been examined by
7. See generally James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A
Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 68
(2000).
8. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:
Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era 41 (Stanford Law
School John M. Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 207, and School
of Law, Boalt Hall U.C. Berkeley Law & Economics Research Paper No. 2000-19) (2000),
at http://papers.ssrn.conapaper.tafabstrackid=247737; In re The Provision of
Telecommunications Service Via "Cable Internet," Petition of the United States Internet
Industry Association ("USIIA") to the FCC for Declaratory Rulemaking and Institution
of Rulemaking with Respect to Tariffs for Cable Internet Interconnectivity (filed July 7,
2000), available at http://www.fcc.gov/broadband/usiia-petition-070700.txt.
9. In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and
Other Facilities, F.C.C.R. 19287, 2-3 [ 4 (Sept. 28, 2000), 2000 FCC LEXIS 5242
[hereinafter Access Inquiry] (noting that the "Commission has heretofore taken a 'hands-
off' policy with respect to the high-speed services provided by cable operators" and asking
several questions to "ascertain whether our hands-off policy" remains the correct
approach). The FCC received 112 comments and 29 replies in response to its Notice of
Inquiry. See http://haifoss.fcc.gov/c/s.dll/websql/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.hts.
10. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding the open access ordinance prohibited by the Federal Communications Act);
Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685,
698 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding ordinance invalid under the First Amendment); MediaOne
Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 97 F. Supp. 2d 712, 716-17 (E.D. Va. 2000) (holding
ordinance invalid under the Communications Act and as ultra vires under state law).
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antitrust agencies and the FCC in their review of mergers between
cable companies and ISPs. Recently, for example, as a condition of
approving the merger between AOL and Time Warner, the nation's
second largest cable operator, the Federal Trade Commission
required the firm to accept certain access obligations; generally, AOL
Time Warner will have to offer subscribers service from three
unaffiliated ISPs along with service from its proprietary ISP, and it
will have to enter into access agreements with any other interested
independent ISP unless it has some reason for refusing other than to
avoid competition." In approving the transfer of licenses associated
with the merger, the FCC endorsed the requirements and imposed
certain other conditions intended to encourage AOL Time Warner to
enter into contracts with independent ISPs.12  Moreover,
commentators have suggested that bundling by cable operators
constitutes monopolization or tying in violation of the antitrust laws.13
The question we address specifically is whether government
should require open access.14 But this question is only one aspect of a
larger issue: when should the government regulate competitive
conduct in the new economy, which is characterized by extraordinary
rates of innovation, modest capital requirements, economies of scale
in production and consumption, and frequent entry and exit? This
question has no simple answer. Richard Posner argues that antitrust
doctrine can "take in stride the competitive issues presented by the
new economy," but that government institutions-enforcement
agencies and courts-"do not have adequate technical resources, and
do not move fast enough, to cope effectively with a very complex
business sector that changes very rapidly.' 5  He concludes
pessimistically, "[t]his problem will be extremely difficult to solve;
indeed, I cannot even glimpse a complete solution.' 16
11. See In re America Online, Inc., F.T.C. CS No. C-3989, §§ II.A. 1-2, II.B. 1 (2000)
(Decision and Order) [hereinafter Decision and Order].
12. See In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and
Section 214 Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors,
to AOL Time Warner Inc., Transferee, F.C.C. CS No. 00-30 (Jan 22,2001) (Memorandum
Opinion and Order) [hereinafter FCC AOL/Time Warner Order].
13. See, e.g., Lemley & Lessig, supra note 8, at 52-55.
14. We are not particularly concerned here with the source of the legal obligation, be
it antitrust or regulatory laws, or the implications of open access for other social policies,
such as those embodied in the First Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 925
(2001).
16. Id.
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Our guiding principle is that government intervention in a
market-including markets in the new economy-is justifiable only if
it maximizes the welfare of consumers. Taking into account the
relative competence of regulatory institutions and the market in
promoting consumer interests, the burden of proof is on those who
advocate intervention. On this basis, we do not believe that the case
for mandatory open access has been made.
Cable bundling might represent a threat to consumer welfare for
two reasons. First, it might have an immediate adverse effect on the
prices consumers pay for broadband Internet services or the quality
of the services available. The possibility of immediate consumer
injury is unquestionably a legitimate concern, and it apparently led
the FTC to impose access obligations on AOL Time Warner. 17 If a
cable company could leverage local monopoly power in broadband
transmission services into the provision of Internet services,
consumers would suffer. But given the general absence of rate
regulation over cable service,'8 economic theory predicts that even a
cable company with market power could not profitably raise prices by
bundling transmission and Internet services and would have no
incentive to offer inferior services.
A second concern, both more pressing and more elusive, is that
bundling might stifle innovation, thereby inflicting a future injury on
consumers in the form of valuable inventions forgone. Bundling
likely implies a reduction in the number of broadband ISPs, and some
commentators predict that a reduction in the amount and an
undesirable change in the kind of innovation will inevitably follow.19
Moreover, these critics contend that, because cable companies will
control the architecture of the pipelines, they will have an incentive
and the ability to make design decisions, whether innocently or
strategically, that favor their proprietary ISPs, thereby compromising
the principle of openness that has fostered the extraordinary growth
of the Internet. In particular, the threat of strategic design decisions
17. The FTC challenged the merger of AOL and Time Warner on the ground that it
would have immediate anticompetitive effects, primarily in the broadband Internet
services, or access, market. See Complaint, In re America Online, Inc., F.T.C. CS No. C-
3989, 25 (filed Dec. 14, 2000) [hereinafter FTC Complaint]. And though it imposed an
open access requirement as a remedy, the practice of bundling was not the ostensible basis
of its complaint. It is therefore not clear whether the FTC believed that bundling causes
immediate anticompetitive effects.
18. See 47 U.S.C. § 543 (Supp. 111997).
19. Lemley & Lessig, supra note 8, at 23-29.
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made to injure nonaffiliated ISPs will chill their investments in
innovation.
Although future consumer injury is an appropriate concern of
competition policy, predictions of future harm, particularly in the
form of lost innovation, tend to be inherently speculative. 20 It is often
a weak basis for government intervention. Especially when
consumers enjoy clear and immediate benefits from a practice,
prohibiting it in the name of greater future good is usually unwise.2'
In the context of cable bundling, the theory of impaired innovation is
shaky. While consumer benefits from allowing cable companies
discretion to bundle are not demonstrably compelling, they are
sufficiently predictable to conclude that the presumption in favor of
the market, which undergirds antitrust law and telecommunciations
policy, has not been rebutted, particularly because the costs of any
regulatory response would be high.
In reaching our conclusion, we draw lessons from the ongoing
government antitrust case against Microsoft.22 The similarities
between cable bundling and Microsoft are striking, though there are
significant differences as well. For instance, the central claim in
Microsoft is that a firm with monopoly power in personal computer
operating systems anticompetitively bundled Windows with a
complementary product, the Internet Explorer (IE) web browser,
thereby excluding from the market a rival browser, Netscape's
Navigator.23 To an extent, the cable broadband transmission service
is comparable to the operating system-both are seemingly dominant
platforms-and the practice of bundling transmission service and
Internet service is akin to combining Windows and IE. In both
situations, competitors in the complementary market suffer. And the
district court found that consumers were harmed largely because
20. John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Monopolization, Innovation, and Consumer
Welfare, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming Spring 2001).
21. John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, "Obvious" Consumer Harm in Antitrust
Policy: The Chicago School, the Post-Chicago School, and the Courts, in POST-CHICAGO
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (Roger van
den Bergh et al. eds., forthcoming 2001).
22. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (findings of
fact); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) (conclusions of
law); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (remedy). As of
this writing, appeal is pending before the United States Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia.
23. Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 40-44. The district court found that Microsoft violated
the antitrust laws in several other ways. See, e.g., Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 39-46. But
throughout this Article, we focus on the bundling conduct.
[Vol. 52
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Microsoft's conduct impeded innovation,24 just as some commentators
suggest that cable modem bundling will inhibit innovation in ISPs.
We have argued elsewhere that the district court in Microsoft erred
by failing to recognize that immediate and palpable consumer
benefits outweigh speculative claims of consumer harm in the
antitrust calculus.Z2 In our view, those who advocate compulsory
open access make a similar mistake.
I. The Market for Broadband Internet Access
For present analytical purposes, the relevant industry can be
divided into three segments. First, some firms, like cable operators
and telephone companies, offer transmission services over
information conduits, or pipes, through which data is exchanged
between a consumer and an Internet site. The issue of cable bundling
pertains to the segment of the transmission system between the
outside of a consumer's residence and an aggregation point. Second,
ISPs provide consumers with services that link them, or provide
access, to Internet sites through data pipes. ISP services vary from
the minimal, or mere access, to the extensive, such as e-mail
accounts. 26 Third, some firms provide Internet content. Of course,
some firms perform multiple functions. Cable companies, for
instance, offer both transmission and Internet services. ISPs often
provide Internet content as well. Though the categories have fuzzy
boundaries, it is helpful to keep them distinct and recognize that
vertical integration is common in the industry.
24. For example, the district court found, "[t]he actions that Microsoft took against
Navigator hobbled a form of innovation that had shown the potential to depress the
applications barrier to entry sufficiently to enable other firms to compete effectively
against Microsoft in the market for Intel-compatible PC operating systems." Microsoft, 65
F. Supp. 2d at 103. The court also found, "Microsoft's past success in... stifling
innovation deters investment in technologies and businesses that exhibit the potential to
threaten Microsoft. The ultimate result is that some innovations that would truly benefit
consumers never occur for the sole reason that they do not coincide with Microsoft's self-
interest." Id.
25. See, e.g., Lopatka & Page, supra note 20.
26. The terminology in this field is not uniform. For example, in some contexts, the
term Internet access provider (IAP) denotes the firm that connects the consumer to the
Internet. It subsumes the category of ISP, which then denotes a firm that provides
relatively extensive Internet services to consumers. See generally Internet Service
Providers, supra note 6, at 362. The district court in Microsoft used the term Internet
access provider to refer generally to a firm that provides any level of Internet service, but
it used ISP to denote firms that provide minimal service and Online services suppliers
(OLSs) to denote firms that provide relatively extensive services. See Microsoft, 65 F.
Supp. 2d at 5.
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No one doubts that broadband connections are becoming an
increasingly valuable mode of Internet access.27 Most fundamentally,
they permit consumers to achieve far greater speeds in their Internet
connections. They also make possible some services, such as realtime
video transfer and interactive gaming, that narrowband connections
cannot provide.28 They offer businesses new opportunities for
electronic commerce, which inure to the benefit of consumers. The
market for broadband access is growing fast; the only question is how
fast. One particularly grand estimate is that the market for high-
speed Internet connections and other broadband services will reach
40 million consumers in the next several years.2 9
Narrowband and broadband connections are substitutes on the
demand side for some purposes. A particular consumer with lots of
time and little interest in advanced services, for example, may be
largely indifferent between broadband and narrowband access.
Nevertheless, the two kinds of access are probably different enough
to justify treating them as separate markets. Products are in the same
antitrust market if they are "reasonably interchangeable by
consumers for the same purposes. ''30 The federal enforcement
agencies define a relevant product market for purposes of merger
review by asking whether a hypothetical monopolist of the product
could profitably raise prices by 5%.31  Without any empirical
investigation, we assume that under any sensible test, broadband
27. The FCC now avoids using the term "broadband" in its analysis because of the
term's imprecision. Rather, it denominates as "high-speed" those services with 200
kilobits per second (kbps) or faster in at least one direction; it defines "advanced
telecommunications capability" and "advanced services" as services offering speeds of 200
kbps or faster in both directions. See Second Report, supra note 5, at 8. For our purposes,
the distinctions are unimportant, and we use these terms as well as "broadband"
interchangeably.
28. See, e.g., Martin Peers, Video on Demand Arrives-Sort Of: Long-Delayed Home
Service Delivers Movies Instantly, But Film Choices Are Thin, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2001,
at B1; Anna Wilde Mathews, Video on Demand Arrives-Sort Of- Studios Have Their
Own Movies-on-Demand Plans, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2001, at B1.
29. See Arik Hesseldahl, ADSL vs. Cable Modems: The Coming Battle, ELECrRONIC
NEWS, Jan. 4, 1999, at 44, 44 (citing estimate by Sprint). Another, more recent estimate is
that there will be some 25 million subscribers to broadband service through either cable
modems or DSLs by 2005. See Simon Romero, D.S.L. Service for Linking to Internet Is
Problem Ridden, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,2000, at C1.
30. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,395 (1956).
31. See United States Dept. of Justice and FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 13,104, § 1.11 (1992), available at http:llwww.ftc.govlbcl
docs/horizmer.htm [hereinafter Merger Guidelines].
[Vol. 52
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access represents a separate market, as the FTC alleged in its review
of the AOL/Time Warner merger.32
These tests define markets in a static sense. To ask whether a
5% price increase would induce enough consumers to switch from
broadband to narrowband to make the increase unprofitable is to
estimate consumer preferences among products with particular
qualities at a given point in time. But consumers' tastes and a
product's qualities can change. Consequently, a static analysis is an
appropriate starting point, but it is incomplete.
In the market for broadband residential transmission services,
the two principal competitors are cable operators and local telephone
companies offering DSL connections. Each of these methods of
broadband connection has a distinct set of technical advantages and
limitations. Telephone transmission lines running between switching
stations generally have enough capacity for broadband service. 33 But
the local loop that connects a consumer's home to the switching office
typically does not have broadband capacity. It has been called the
"last mile" in the race to provide broadband transmission services to
consumers? 4 The telephone network was designed for two-way voice
communications, and local loops adequate for that purpose are
inadequate for digital transmission of data at high speeds. Phone
companies, however, can sometimes employ DSL technology to
transform the existing local loop into a high-speed conduit. The
technological details are unimportant here, but a few characteristics
32. See FTC Complaint, supra note 17, 21.
33. A distinction can be drawn between a network's "backbone," which "provides a
long-distance, high-capacity, high-speed transmission path for transporting massive
quantities of data," and "middle mile" facilities, which "provide relatively fast, large-
capacity connections between backbone and last mile." Second Report, supra note 5, at
10. For our purposes, the distinction between the backbone and middle mile facilities is
unimportant. The capacity of both kinds of facilities appears to be adequate to satisfy the
demand for broadband services, though in some geographic areas middle mile facilities
may represent a bottleneck. Id. at 12, 18, 83-85.
34. More precisely, the "last mile is the link between the middle mile and the last 100
feet to the end-user's terminal. The last mile is analogous to the local road between a
larger, divided highway and a traveler's driveway." Second Report, supra note 5, at 11.
"The last 100 feet is the link between the last mile and the end-user's terminal," which is
analogous to the driveway itself. Id. This segment of the network includes wiring inside a
house or an apartment building, and though it sometimes is a barrier to the deployment of
advanced telecommunications capability to small businesses and schools, it is generally not
a barrier in residential settings. Id. at 29. See Speta, supra note 7, at 45; Chip Brookshaw
et al., Last-Mile Alternatives, INFOWORLD, Sept. 21, 1998, at 90, 92.
April 2001] INTERNET REGULATION
HeinOnline  -- 52 Hastings L.J. 899 2000-2001
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
are significant.35 First, the conversion of a local loop to a DSL is
costly.36 Second, the technology works only when the subscriber's
residence is fairly close to the central office. 37 The implication is that
some telephone customers could not obtain DSL service even at the
significant cost conversion always entails.
Cable systems were designed to be one-way networks, in which
information flowed out to subscribers. They can, however, be
converted to accommodate two-way, high-speed data transmission.
Like the upgrade of standard local loops, the conversion of cable
systems into two-way networks requires an investment, and cable
companies are acting quickly to convert their systems.3 8 But the
geographical limitations of the technology are not as acute as are
those of DSL technology, and the cost of transforming the system
appears to be lower.
In operation, DSL technology offers certain advantages over
cable.39 For example, only DSL provides a dedicated link between
the provider and each home, which means simultaneous fast Internet
and voice/fax capabilities over a single line.40 Because cable is shared
by multiple users, its data security is inferior and its performance
deteriorates as the number of cable users increases. But cable has an
advantage in that new services are available to all homes passed by an
upgraded cable system, whereas they may not be available to some
end-users even in upgraded DSL areas.41 Nevertheless, applying the
tests suggested above, these differences generally are not great
enough to justify treating cable broadband access and DSL access as
separate product markets.42
35. In fact, there are several kinds of DSL technologies. See Second Report, supra
note 5, at 21-23; Speta, supra note 7, at 51-54. The differences are not relevant for present
purposes.
36. See Second Report, supra note 5, at 21-23 (describing the technical requirements
of DSL service).
37. Id. at 22. For the most popular kind of DSL service used by residential consumers,
the maximum distance is 18,000 feet. For the less popular and more expensive kind of
DSL service, maximum distances are even shorter, between 10,000 and 12,000 feet. Id.
38. See Second Report, supra note 5, at 19-21 (describing the modifications necessary
to make cable systems capable of offering high-speed services).
39. Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d
685, 688 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (citing A Staff Report to William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC on
Industry Monitoring Sessions Convened by Cable Services Bureau, Oct. 1999,
BROADBAND TODAY, at 20-21); Speta, supra note 7, at 56.
40. See Second Report, supra note 5, at 19,22.
41. See id. at 20, 23.
42. In theory, DSL or cable may be so much better than the other for a particular use
that a market should be defined for that end use, if the provider can discriminate in the
[Vol. 52
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Apart from the differences in technological limitations, the chief
difference between the two modes of transmission lies in their
availability. Telephone service is nearly universal, but not all phone
lines have been upgraded to DSL capability, and as indicated above,
not all phone lines physically can be converted. Cable systems now
pass approximately 97% of all television households, and nearly two-
thirds of all television households are cable subscribers.43 In all, the
last-mile facilities necessary to provide high-speed Internet access to
consumers are being deployed rapidly, and cable operators are in the
lead.44 At the end of 2000, about 3.4 million homes and businesses
had broadband access through cable modems, compared with 1.2
million DSL subscribers. 45 But the lead is expected to shrink. One
estimate is that by 2005 there will be about 13.8 million cable-modem
subscribers and 11.2 million DSL subscribers. 46
Cable and DSL services are not the only means of broadband
transmission. Many phone companies offer more traditional high-
speed, circuit-switched services like TI lines, and they can install fiber
optic lines.47 A variety of fixed wireless service providers, such as
cellular telephone companies, personal communications services
(PCS) providers, and multipoint distribution service (MDS)
providers, are beginning to convert their systems to multimedia and
high-speed data applications, and new terrestrial wireless services are
being developed to provide at least some broadband access. 48 In
addition, broadband access through satellites is in the developmental
stage.49 All of these methods have distinct technical and economic
limitations, and none is sufficiently established to have a major effect
on the residential access market today. Still, at least some of them
unquestionably will affect the market in the future, perhaps as early
as the next three to five years.50
price charged for that use. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 31, § 1.12. But this
possibility does not affect the general analysis in this paper.
43. Speta, supra note 7, at 54.
44. See Second Report, supra note 5, at 85-86.
45. Romero, supra note 29.
46. Id. A study conducted in early 2001 found that cable's lead had shrunk during the
preceding nine months: in April 2000, cable accounted for 65% of the broadband market
and DSL accounted for 24%; in January 2001, cable accounted for 51% and DSL
accounted for 39%. Michael Robuck, Despite Problems, DSL Gains Ground on Cable,
ISP WORLD NEWS, Mar. 12,2001, at http://www.ispworld.comlbs/BS_031201b.htm.
47. See Second Report, supra note 5, at 23.
48. See id. at 23-28; Speta, supra note 7, at 57-58.
49. See Second Report supra note 5, at 28-29; Speta, supra note 7, at 60.
50. For example, in August 2000, the FCC concluded, "[a]t this point, many of these
[fixed wireless] services are in an earlier stage of deployment than the traditional 'wired'
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H. The Regulatory Framework of Broadband Internet Access
Pursuant to federal statutes as interpreted by the FCC, local
phone companies, or local exchange carriers (LECs), have various
obligations to unbundle elements of their networks and sell access to
them at cost-based rates, to permit other telecommunications carriers
to interconnect with their facilities, and to sell DSL service to
information service providers, including ISPs, for resale to their
customers.5' Moreover, incumbent companies (ILECs) are required
to establish wholesale rates for the resale of their telecommunications
services. And the largest ILECs-the Bell operating companies and
GTE-are required to provide information service providers
interconnection to transport elements of their systems. In general,
local phone companies are treated as common carriers, and they have
attendant duties to provide all ISPs access to their DSL service at
regulated prices.
By contrast, the law does not treat cable companies as common
carriers with respect to their "cable services. =52 And though the FCC
is reconsidering its policy, it currently interprets "cable services" to
include Internet access and similar information services.53 As a result,
cable operators generally have no present duty to interconnect these
services with other information service providers or to permit other
providers, such as ISPs, to access their systems. Moreover, cable rates
are for the most part unregulated.5 4
Although cable operators have no general obligation under the
Communications Act to permit ISPs to interconnect with their
systems, both the FCC and the FTC have authority to impose
services, cable-modem and DSL technology, but significant growth is anticipated over the
next three to five years, potentially leading to service to millions of households." Second
Report, supra note 5, at 24. The FCC also observed, "there is a real prospect, in the next
several years, of significant deployment of advanced telecommunications capability by
wireless technologies, both terrestrial and satellite-based." Id. at 87-88.
51. See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (Supp. III 1997). See generally Speta, supra note 7, at 62-69;
Thomas M. Jorde et al., Innovation, Investment, and Unbundling, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 1,
2-4 (2000).
52. 47 U.S.C. § 522(7)(B) (Supp. III 1997).
53. See Access Inquiry, supra note 9. See also Speta, supra note 7, at 71-75; AT&T
Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that, "[t]hus far, the
FCC has not subjected cable broadband to any regulation, including common carrier
telecommunications regulation," and concluding that the regulatory position is within the
agency's discretion).
54. See 47 U.S.C. § 543 (Supp. III 1997). Broadband transmission services provided by
fixed wireless systems and satellites are subject to little or no regulation. See Speta, supra
note 7, at 70, 75.
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conditions on the approval of mergers.55 The FTC invoked its
authority under the antitrust laws to require Time Warner, the
nation's second largest cable company,56 to accept open access
obligations as a condition of approving its merger with AOL.57 The
FCC imposed additional conditions under its authority to review the
transfer of licenses and authorizations associated with mergers
involving cable companies and ISPs 8
The treatment of the merger illustrates the convergence of
regulatory and antitrust standards in the evaluation of transactions in
the new economy. Prior to the merger, Time Warner offered
subscribers cable broadband access exclusively through Road
Runner, its partially owned ISP. AOL is the nation's largest
narrowband ISP,59 but it also offers broadband Internet service over
telephone company DSLs. To that extent, Time Warner, through
Road Runner, and AOL were competitors in a broadband Internet
service market.6° In some local areas, both Road Runner and AOL
broadband services were available. In the broadband market, AOL
did not have nearly the dominant position it still has in the
narrowband market. But the FTC alleged "AOL is positioned and
likely to become the leading provider of broadband Internet access as
well." 61
55. The approval of the FCC is required for the transfer of licenses and authorizations
incident to the merger of firms subject to its jurisdiction. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 214(a), 310(d)
(West 2000). The FTC has the power to enforce merger laws through Section 5 of the
FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994), and it has direct authority to enforce the primary merger
provision, Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). See 15 U.S.C. § 219(a)
(1994).
56. Time Warner serves slightly less than 20% of all cable households. MONTHLY
INVESTMENT REV., Sept. 2000, at 8-9.
57. See Decision and Order, supra note 11.
58. FCC AOL/Time Warner Order, supra note 12.
59. According to one estimate, AOL and CompuServe, which it owns, have 40% of
the consumer-subscribers to ISPs; the next largest is Microsoft's MSN, with 4.1%.
MONTHLY INVESTMENT REV., Sept. 2000, at 9. The statistics, however, do not distinguish
between broadband and narrowband subscribers.
60. The FTC also alleged that the merger would lessen competition in the broadband
Internet transmission, or transport, services market, even though AOL does not own the
DSL transmission facilities over which it provides Internet services. FTC Complaint,
supra note 17, It 27, 31. The FTC view seems to be that AOL is in effect a sales agent for
DSL transmission service providers and will have little incentive after the merger to
promote DSL service. See Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment
§ III, at http:llwww.ftc.govlos/2000/12/aolanalysis.pdf (2001) ("AOL's merger with Time
Warner will reduce its incentives to promote and market broadband access through DSL
in Time Warner cable areas, adversely affecting DSL rollout in those areas and
nationally .... ).
61. FTC Complaint, supra note 17, 8.
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Prior to but in anticipation of the merger, Time Warner had
negotiated a contract with Earthlink, an independent ISP, under
which that firm would offer broadband Internet service over Time
Warner's cable system in various regions. In reaching a consent
agreement resolving its review, the FTC approved the contract and
insisted that AOL Time Warner enter into comparable cable system
access agreements with two additional non-affiliated ISPs in those
regions as a condition of providing its own broadband Internet
service;62 in other operating areas, Time Warner is required to enter
into access agreements with three non-affiliated ISPs. 63 All of these
contracts must contain a "most favored nation clause:" if an ISP
affiliated with the new firm, including AOL and Road Runner, enters
into a contract with another major cable system, the non-affiliated
ISPs providing service on the AOL Time Warner system are entitled
to the terms and conditions contained in it.64 AOL Time Warner is
also required to make available to the non-affiliated ISPs with which
it has agreements any advantageous services provided to its affiliated
ISPs.65  Further, the agency demanded a general open access
commitment. AOL Time Warner is required to "negotiate and enter
into arms' length, commercial agreements with any Non-affiliated ISP
(in addition to [the ISPs described above]) that seeks to provide
Cable Broadband ISP Service," except that the firm can refuse to
enter into such a contract based on cable broadband technical
limitations or business considerations other than an adverse impact
on its own ISP service; it can impose rates, terms, and conditions
based on the same considerations, but the determinations must be
made "without discrimination on the basis of affiliation. '66
Finally, the FTC imposed conditions designed to prevent the
merged firm from raising prices to subscribers of AOL's DSL
broadband services in markets where Time Warner cable broadband
services are available: if AOL Time Warner offers broadband
services through the DSL facilities of any regional Bell operating
company where its cable system is unavailable, it must offer
comparable prices and terms to its DSL Internet services subscribers
in areas where its cable broadband services are available, though it
may make allowances for differences in cost.67 It must also market
62. Decision and Order, supra note 11, § II.A.
63. Id. § II.B.
64. Id. § II.C.1.
65. Id. § II.C.2, 3.
66. Id. § II.E. (emphasis added).
67. Id. § IV.A.
[Vol. 52
HeinOnline  -- 52 Hastings L.J. 904 2000-2001
INTERNET REGULATION
and promote DSL services to subscribers where cable broadband
services are available to the same extent that it markets and promotes
its DSL services where its cable service is unavailable.68
The FCC had declined to condition its approval of two earlier
mergers on open access obligations,69 but it imposed such
requirements on the AOL Time Warner merger.70 The FCC
endorsed the conditions contained in the FTC consent order, but it
concluded that they "may not entirely mitigate AOL Time Warner's
ability to discriminate against unaffiliated ISPs on its cable network
through indirect means."'71 Accordingly, the FCC imposed a set of
additional conditions regarding a subscriber's freedom to choose
service from an unaffiliated ISP, the ability of unaffiliated ISPs to use
their own first screens, the ability of these ISPs to bill subscribers
directly, and the right of these ISPs to the same technical
performance provided to affiliated ISPs.72
1. Cable Bundling and Consumer Welfare
The practice of bundling cable broadband transmission and
Internet services poses precisely the kinds of policy issues that are at
the heart of the new economy. Industries in the new economy share a
set of distinctive features. In particular, they are characterized by
modest capital requirements relative to the available supply, strong
economies of scale in production and consumption, or network
effects, and high rates of innovation. As a result, markets are often
dominated by a single firm at any given time, and entry and exit occur
frequently. In this Part we set out the appropriate standard for
evaluation of the cable bundling issue, then analyze the costs and
benefits of the practice.
68. Id § IV.B.
69. The FCC declined to impose an open access condition in approving the
AT&T/TCI merger in 1999, AT&T/TCI Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3160, 3207 96, and it later
refused to impose the condition in approving the AT&T MediaOne merger,
AT&T/MediaOne Order 15 F.C.C.R. 9816, 9866-71 116-23, though it is considering a
petition for reconsideration in the latter case. See In re Applications for Consent to the
Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc.,
Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, FCC CS No. 99-251 (filed July 5, 2000). Part of
the basis for its AT&T/MediaOne decision was that the merged firm had entered into a
consent agreement with the Justice Department to divest its ownership in Road Runner
by December 31,2001.
70. See FCC AOLJTime Warner Order, supra note 12, 1 126-27. The FCC found that
the circumstances presented in AOIJTime Warner "are dramatically different from those
permitted in our former cases, and compel a different result." IdL 54.
71. Id. 85-86.
72. See id. 126.
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A. The Analytical Standard
We believe that public policy on cable bundling should maximize
the welfare of consumers. At a minimum, justifiable intervention in a
market under our standard requires that the relevant economic actors
have the ability and incentive to injure consumers, particularly
through anticompetitive conduct. Then, intervention is justified only
if its full expected costs, including any immediate efficiency losses,
any future losses brought about by depressed incentives to increase
services or to innovate, and the direct costs of effectuating the
regulation, are outweighed by the expected gains to consumers in
whatever form. Because the market is more nimble than government
in the allocation of resources and (usually) in the destruction of
monopolies, the burden of proving that the conditions for
intervention are satisfied is on the proponents of intervention.
In accordance with standard economic theory, our analysis
assumes that market participants act rationally to maximize their
profits, or more generally, their utility.73 But some commentators
assert that cable companies might not act rationally. 4 Though the
behavioral law and economics literature has offered interesting
evidence of apparently systematic, irrational conduct in some
circumstances, it is not nearly developed enough to justify
abandoning the rationality assumption as the basis of competition
policy.75 At this stage in its development, it can at best offer unique
policy prescriptions in isolated circumstances, none of which are
clearly present in the case of cable bundling.76
We accord primary weight to immediate effects, good or bad, on
consumers. To be sure, any sensible regulatory environment has to
be sensitive to long-term effects, particularly those flowing from
innovation. But because little is known about the welsprings of
inventive activity, government intervention can rarely be justified
solely on the ground that it protects the processes of innovation. At
73. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-4, 17-18,
460-63 (5th ed. 1998).
74. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 8, at 33 ("[1It is not necessarily the case that cable
companies will do the rational thing.").
75. See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
76. Lemley and Lessig assert that cable companies might act irrationally in discounting
the value of new ideas that diverge from their entrenched business practices. See Lemley
& Lessig, supra note 8, at 34. Of course, new business directions imply risk, and there is
nothing irrational about placing a higher value on less risky conduct. Irrationality requires
that the discount rate for the risky choice be higher than objectively warranted. There is
no theory or evidence to suggest that cable companies will irrationally discount the value
of a new business direction.
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one time, scholars argued that practices causing an immediate
consumer loss should be left alone in order to stimulate innovation.77
More recently, commentators insist that practices causing no
immediate consumer harm should be prohibited in order to promote
innovation. Competition policy has often heard arguments that
enforcement should keep the channels of trade open. In the same
vein, commentators have recently suggested that "architectural"
principles can provide background assumptions that will allow
regulators to promote innovation effectively by intervening in
network markets. As we show below, however, these arguments
should not deflect the analysis from its principal focus on the relevant
practice's immediate effects on consumers.
B. Costs of Bundling
The costs associated with bundling cable modem services and
Internet access might be immediate-higher prices from restricting
output or excluding rivals. Or they might be more distant-a long-
term reduction in innovation. We consider the possibilities in turn.
(1) Immediate Injury
Competition policy is on its most secure footing when a robust
theory predicts that a given practice will have an immediate
anticompetitive effect on consumers and yield no more than a trivial
gain in productive efficiency. This is the basis for the per se rule in
antitrust law, which condemns, for instance, a naked price fixing
agreement without proof of its effects in the particular case.78 Prices
increase immediately, quantities decline, and any cost savings are
inconsequential. And though the market is likely to undermine the
agreement eventually, the costs of antitrust enforcement are
sufficiently low in relation to the harm done in the meantime that
intervention is justified.7 9
But cable bundling is not naked price fixing. It has no
predictable, immediate anticompetitive effects on consumers. The
intuitive argument that the practice does immediately raise prices is
that the cable company is a monopolist that, through bundling,
leverages its power in the transmission market into the market for
77. See, e.g., DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR
REPEAL 17-23 (1986).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,218 (1940).
79. Frank Easterbrook has observed that the "central purpose of antitrust is to speed
up the arrival of the long run." Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1984).
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Internet services. Instead of paying a monopoly price for
transmission alone, the consumer will also have to pay a monopoly
price for Internet services.
The intuition is mistaken. First, the argument by its own terms is
limited to situations where the firm has monopoly power in a relevant
market.80 This condition does not hold in markets in which DSL
service provides effective competition.81 More importantly, when
products are complements used together in fixed proportions to
satisfy some ultimate demand, a monopolist of one of the products
generally cannot increase its profits by acquiring a monopoly over the
other.82 There is only one monopoly profit to be earned, and a
monopolist of either can extract its full measure. In fact, if a
monopoly price is set independently for each product, the profits will
be less than if a monopoly price is set for only one of them.83 The
provision of cable modem and Internet access services surely meets
these criteria, because neither service can be used in variable
proportions with the other-both are equally essential for broadband
cable Internet access. To this extent, if a cable company has a
monopoly of broadband transmission services in an area, it will have
no incentive to bundle Internet service with it as a way of increasing
80. As noted above, broadband transmission is appropriately considered a market
separate from narrowband transmission, despite a degree of substitutability between the
two. But cable broadband transmission is not sufficiently different from DSL broadband
transmission to treat them as separate markets for most purposes. Indeed, the FTC's
order in AOL/Time Warner depended on the premise that DSL and cable broadband are
in the same product market. See FTC Complaint, supra note 17, 25 (alleging that a
merger between a provider of cable broadband service and a provider of DSL broadband
service would eliminate "existing" competition). Though a cable company is almost
always the only supplier of cable service in a given area, in areas where DSL service is
available, the cable company does not have a monopoly in broadband transmission
service. In areas where DSL service is unavailable, one might argue that the cable
operator still has no monopoly power because the phone company could upgrade its lines.
But that kind of supply response may well take too long to deter the cable company from
exercising monopoly power in the short run. Further, the limitations of the technology
may prevent phone companies from installing DSL service from existing switching stations
to some phone subscribers, and the cable company may have some market power as a
result.
81. Of course, prices charged by duopolists may be higher than prices in perfectly
competitive markets. One could say that a duopolist has some market power over prices,
even if it is not technically monopoly power. But in this market, the prices charged by one
of the duopolists, the local phone company, are more or less rigorously regulated, which
affects the predicted result. In any event, the question would be whether the cable
duopolist has the incentive and power to increase its supra-competitive profits through
bundling. For the reasons set out in the following text, apparently it does not.
82. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 173 (1976).
83. See, e.g., ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 34 (1983).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52
HeinOnline  -- 52 Hastings L.J. 908 2000-2001
prices to consumers. Indeed, the cable company's only incentive to
integrate forward would be to provide Internet service more
efficiently, thus enhancing demand for cable modem service. To the
extent open access enhanced consumer demand, it would be the most
attractive strategy.
The general analysis, however, has some well-recognized
qualifications. First, if a firm's prices in one market are regulated, so
that it is prevented from charging a monopoly price, it may be able to
tie its product to one that has unregulated prices, then charge
monopoly prices for the tied product.84 The fundamental reason for
the breakup of AT&T was that the Bell companies were able to
evade rate regulation through vertical integration, 85 a functional
alternative to tying.86 This use of tying to evade regulation is not
necessarily a legitimate target of antitrust law,87 but it is surely an
appropriate concern of regulatory policy. The argument, however,
depends upon the existence of rate regulation in the tying product
market. Cable rates for transmission services are not generally
regulated. Of course, cable service is regulated in other dimensions.
For instance, cable operators are required to carry certain local
broadcast stations.88 Professors Lemley and Lessig contend that cable
companies may therefore have an incentive to bundle.89 But there are
simply no economic models demonstrating that a monopolist free to
charge monopoly prices can increase profits by evading the kind of
non-price regulations to which cable companies are subject. So long
as the price of the cable modem service is unregulated, cable
companies can fully exploit their monopoly power in the price of that
service.
Second, if production of the tied product-here, broadband
Internet services-is subject to scale economies, and if some
consumers desire the tied product without the tying product, the
84. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 376 (1978).
85. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,160-68 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); William F. Baxter, Conditions Creating
Antitrust Concern with Vertical Integration by Regulated Industries-"For Whom the Bell
Doctrine Tolls," 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 243,244 (1983).
86. See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 83, at 52-58.
87. See NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1998) (distinguishing for
purposes of antitrust law between consumer injury that flows from a lessening of
competition and consumer injury that flows from regulatory evasion).
88. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 534, 535 (1994). See generally John E. Lopatka & Michael G.
Vita, The Must-Carry Decisions: Bad Law, Bad Economics, 6 Sup. Cr. ECON. REv. 61,
73-75 (1998).
89. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 8, at 54 n.113.
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seller may be able to drive competing sellers of the tied product from
the market by depriving them of the level of demand they need to
survive through imposition of the tying arrangement. The seller
monopolizes the tied product, thereby deriving monopoly profits
from buyers that otherwise would not have purchased anything from
it.90 But there is no evidence to suggest that demand for broadband
Internet service without cable transmission service-specifically, ISP
service in conjunction with DSL transmission service-is insufficient
to support independent ISPs. Indeed, given the rapidly burgeoning
consumer demand for broadband access, it would be fanciful to
believe that a cable operator could foreclose unaffiliated ISPs from
the market through bundling. This is particularly true because a cable
operator could at best tie up subscribers in its service areas. An
unaffiliated ISP could serve consumers across cable service areas,
allowing it to achieve any economies of scale that are not local.
Tying arrangements have also been explained as methods of
price discrimination, such as by measuring demand through metering
use.91 In such a case, the practice increases the seller's profits relative
to what they would be if it sold the products separately at uniform
prices. We cannot see how cable bundling could be an effective form
of price discrimination, given that Internet services are ordinarily
used in fixed proportions with broadband transmission service. But
scholars have offered clever and unexpected price discrimination
explanations in other instances of tying. In particular, Benjamin
Klein has suggested price discrimination theories to explain
Microsoft's bundling of Windows and its IE browser92 and Kodak's
policy of refusing to sell copier repair parts to independent service
organizations. 93 Perhaps there is a price discrimination explanation
for cable bundling. Even so, the welfare implications of price
discrimination are ambiguous. Some consumers are likely to gain,
90. See Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV.
837 (1990). For an interesting application of this "foreclosure" theory of tying to the
Microsoft case, see STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS &
MICROSOFr 249-52 (1999) (concluding that the theory probably does not apply).
91. Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE
L.J. 19, 23-24 (1957); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade
Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 281 (1956); POSNER, supra note 82, at 173-74; BORK, supra
note 84, at 376-78.
92. See Benjamin Klein, Microsoft's Use of Zero Price Bundling to Fight the "Browser
Wars," in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST
IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999).
93. See Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak, 3
Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 65-71 (1993).
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others to lose. Cable bundling as price discrimination would not
necessarily imply net consumer injury.
If cable operators are not likely to be able to raise prices by
bundling, perhaps they can be expected to inflict an immediate
consumer injury by delivering less desirable Internet services. But
generally even a monopolist has an incentive to offer what consumers
want, because as George Stigler explained, "a monopolist who does
not cater to the diversities of his buyers' desires will suffer a
substantial decline in profits." 94  In limited circumstances, a
monopolist can profit by making both quantity and quality choices
that diverge from the competitive norms.95 Even then, the firm might
produce more or less quality than would exist in a competitive
market. But in any event there is little reason to expect cable
bundling to fall within the special case. Cable companies entering the
broadband Internet access market can be expected to offer the
Internet services consumers want.96 The real objection is that these
services over time will become less valuable than they would be if
bundling were proscribed, because bundling will slow the pace and
distort the path of innovation. That claim we address in the next
section.
The objections raised by the FTC and the FCC in AOL/Time
Warner are seemingly based on a prediction of immediate consumer
harm. The prospect of injury has more to do with horizontal aspects
of the merger than with the general practice of bundling. But the
remedy devised for the alleged anticompetitive harm directly attacks
bundling, and the case in general illustrates some of the pitfalls
government intervention faces in this area. Prior to the merger, Time
Warner offered consumers high-speed Internet services exclusively
through its proprietary ISP, Road Runner. In some of its service
areas, AOL offered competing broadband service over DSLs. To this
extent, the merger was horizontal in local broadband Internet service
markets, and concentration was undoubtedly high. But the open
94. George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44,61 (1964).
95. See, e.g., A. Michael Spence, Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation, 6 BELL J. ECON.
417 (1975).
96. Even Lemley and Lessig seem to concede that the cable company may choose "the
most efficient" ISP. Lemley & Lessig, supra note 8, at 45 n.81. But they assert that
consumers might nevertheless be worse off than they would be under competitive
conditions. Id. The theoretical basis of the assertion is obscure. The cable operator will
select a single ISP, rather than offer interconnection to all ISPs at a monopoly price, only
if there are efficiencies of short-term or long-term integration. If the cable firm chooses a
single ISP under these conditions, the implication is that consumers are indeed best off, at
least for the time being.
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access remedy imposed went far beyond any lessening of competition
brought about by the merger. AOL was a Road Runner competitor
only because it-like other ISPs--could use phone company DSLs.
As common carriers, phone companies could not enter into exclusive
contracts with ISPs. So if AOL stopped competing with Road
Runner after the merger and prices increased as a result, the 6,000
other ISPs in the country were free to initiate service over the DSLs
in the relevant areas. Converting a local loop to DSL service may be
too lengthy a process to defeat an anticompetitive price increase, but
there is little reason to believe that initiating Internet service over
existing DSLs would be.
Further, in many areas served by Time Warner, AOL offered no
broadband service. In these Internet services markets, AOL was only
a potential competitor. If Time Warner was able to charge non-
competitive, relatively high prices for broadband service, it was
because upgrading the local loops for DSL capacity represented an
entry barrier. The merger had no effect on that condition. In these
markets, AOL was only one of many potential competitors, and its
elimination had no obvious anticompetitive consequences.
In markets both where AOL was an actual competitor and where
it was a potential competitor, therefore, the open access mandates
effectively give consumers more broadband ISP options than they
would have had absent the merger. In the former, AOL Time
Warner will have to offer subscribers the services of at least three
unaffiliated ISPs, even though the merger at worst eliminated only
one competitor; in the latter, subscribers will be able to choose from
among at least four ISPs, whereas if an entry barrier existed, only one
ISP, Road Runner, had been available. Relative to the alleged threat
to broadband Internet service competition, then, the remedy was
excessive.
The FTC also alleged that the merger would lessen competition
in the broadband Internet transmission market, even though AOL
was neither an actual nor potential competitor in that market.97 Its
theory apparently was that AOL was a kind of marketing agent for
DSL suppliers. After the merger, AOL would stop promoting DSL
service because of its interest in cable transmission. 98
The theory of competitive harm in the broadband transmission
market as well as the theory supporting excessive relief for
anticompetitive harm in the Internet services market might make
97. See FTC Complaint, supra note 17, at 14.
98. See id.
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some sense if AOL was somehow unique-if no other ISP could take
the competitive place of AOL, either as a supplier of broadband
Internet services or a sales agent for DSL providers. But the
assumption is unfounded. True, AOL has a commanding lead in
narrowband ISP subscribership. 99 But commercial success does not
imply that the firm is some kind of an essential facility. Besides, AOL
does not have a large share of broadband subscribers. Cable
companies did not view AOL as essential when launching broadband
services, and phone companies apparently do not consider AOL to be
an essential agent in the sales of DSL service. And if AOL is unique,
if it is destined to take over the entire broadband Internet services
market, perhaps because the market is subject to network effects,
then the merger is neither here nor there. It will dominate with or
without the merger, and whether or not AOL Time Warner is
compelled to sell access to independent ISPs.
One theory the FTC did not articulate is that, because of
economies of scale in the Internet services market, the integration of
AOL and Time Warner will leave insufficient demand for
independent ISPs to efficiently offer broadband services through
other non-Time Warner transmission pipes. This theory is analogous
to the anticompetitive explanation for tying noted above that depends
on economies of scale in the tied product market.1°° Though the
theory is coherent, it does not fit the case. Time Warner has only
about 20% of the national market for cable subscribers, and even if
broadband Internet service were offered to these subscribers solely
through AOL, the amount of the market foreclosed to rival ISPs
would seem to be far too small to prevent them from reaching an
efficient scale.
(2) Future Injury: Harm to Innovation
The strongest objections to cable bundling pertain not to
immediate anticompetitive effects, but to the prospect of future
consumer harm. Critics claim that the practice results in less and
distorted innovation, which otherwise would generate better and
cheaper products and services. Fewer firms pursue innovation, and
the firms that do, including cable companies themselves, carry on the
99. See id. at 8.
100. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. See also D. Douglas Bernheim &
Michael D. Whinston, Exclusive Dealing, 106 J. POL. EcON. 64 (1998) (making a similar
argument with respect to exclusive dealing, a functional equivalent to vertical integration).
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wrong kind. In fact, the alleged threat to innovation comes from
several interrelated sources.
The basic argument seems to be that, because the cable operator
has control over the transmission pipe, it will have the ability to
modify that pipe in ways that benefit its integrated method of
providing Internet service. The principle of "end-to-end" (e2e)
design, which has always governed the Internet and is responsible for
its phenomenal growth, will thus be compromised. 1 1 According to
this principle, intelligence should be placed at the ends of a network,
and the communications protocols, or transmission pipes, should be
as general, or "dumb," as possible.1°2 Cable operators will tailor their
transmission systems in ways that foreclose rival ISPs. The changes
may be made innocently, in the sense that they improve the
performance of the cable company's captive ISP, or they may be
made strategically, to thwart competitors and thereby protect the
firm's business. The very risk of strategic actions that render
incompatible innovations worthless will deter rival ISPs from
innovating. Bundling therefore will reduce the number of ISPs as
well as the number of ISPs attempting to innovate, and as a result the
amount of innovations in the market will decline. Moreover, the
innovations that do occur will not be optimal.
One assumption embedded in the argument is that the total
volume of innovation varies in direct proportion to the number of
entities engaged in the activity. The more concentrated the market of
innovators, the less innovation. Cable bundling likely implies fewer
ISPs, though this depends on the alternative to bundling and scale
economies in the provision of broadband Internet services. If cable
operators were permitted to offer their own Internet service while
being required to sell transmission services to rival ISPs, and if this
vertical integration produced unique efficiencies that rendered
independent ISPs commercially unviable, the market would be no less
concentrated without bundling, except during the short term.
Further, not much is known yet about economies of scale in the
broadband service market, and it could be that precluding bundling
altogether would result in no greater number of broadband ISPs. But
assuming bundling conduces toward concentration, there is no
consensus among economists on the optimal market structure for
innovation. Fewer firms might in fact produce more innovation,
perhaps because they can engage in research and development more
101. See, e.g., Lemley & Lessig, supra note 8, at 3, 6-7.
102. See id.; AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2000).
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efficiently and because the market rewards for successful inventions
are more secure. Intellectual property laws are not perfect, and the
prospect that competitors may be able to free ride can serve as a
deterrent to investing in innovation. Many years ago, Joseph
Schumpeter argued that monopoly market positions are most likely
to foster innovation.10 3 To be sure, that view has been challenged. 104
But no confident prediction can be made that an unconcentrated
market will necessarily produce more innovation than a relatively
concentrated one.
The more intriguing aspect of the argument is that bundling will
deter socially desirable kinds of innovation. Timothy Bresnahan, for
instance, contends that "vertical competition" is particularly
important in computer-related industries where each horizontal level
is highly concentrated. 0 5 Firms at one level may innovate in ways
that allow them to compete with firms at an adjacent level, thereby
improving market performance at the adjacent level. But the claim
has little application in this setting. It is based on the Microsoft case.
The threat to Microsoft's monopoly in personal computer operating
systems arose from innovations by producers of complementary
products. Netscape's Navigator browser and Sun's Java technology,
for example, supposedly threatened to tear down the applications
entry barrier protecting Microsoft's position.10 6 Applied to cable
bundling, 07 the theory would have to be that ISPs are potential
competitors of cable transmission service providers, for given the
atomistic structure of the Internet content market, that is the only
adjacent market concentrated at the local level. But no one has
suggested how ISPs could possibly develop in ways that would
supplant existing methods of broadband transmission. In other
words, Microsoft's browser rival was in fact a platform competitor,
but a cable company's ISP rival is not. It is all well and good to
observe that innovation is unpredictable. 0 8 But this idea has limits.
103. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 87-110
(3d ed. 1942).
104. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources to
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACrIVITY 609 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research ed., 1962), reprinted in COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW:
PRODUCTION AND CAPITAL 104,115 (1985).
105. Timothy F. Bresnahan, New Modes of Competition: Implications for the Future
Structure of the Computer Industry (revised 1998), http://www.pff.org/microsoft/
bresnahan.html (last visited Mar. 2001).
106. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1,103 (D.D.C. 1999).
107. See Lemley & Lessig, supra note 8, at 22.
108. See, e.g., id
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Indeed, if ISPs could somehow develop into platform competitors, it
is not appreciably less likely that ICPs could do the same, and cable
bundling has no effect on that highly competitive level of the industry.
Perhaps, though, bundling might forestall improvements in the
quality of Internet services available. This suggestion does not
depend on changing the transmission pipes to the disadvantage of
independent ISPs, but on the cable operator's decision to allow only
its own ISP to use its system. A cable operator has an incentive to
offer the most valuable Internet services available. The value of any
market power in transmission services increases with the demand for
complementary products, such as Internet services. But the claim
here seems to be that desirable Internet services will never become
available, because they would have resulted from the innovative
activity of independent ISPs that will in fact not take place.
Consumers won't know what they're missing.10 9
To some extent, this argument draws upon the claim already
discussed that innovation is inversely related to market concentration.
As suggested above, even a monopolist has an incentive to innovate.
The court made precisely this finding of fact in Microsoft: "The fact
that Microsoft invests heavily in research and development does not
evidence a lack of monopoly power. Indeed, Microsoft has incentives
to innovate aggressively despite its monopoly power."" 0 Without
doubt, a monopolist may innovate in ways that build upon its
embedded business. This is a kind of path dependence, and it is
ubiquitous in the economy."' But that is not necessarily socially
undesirable. The path of innovation taken by the firm may best serve
its own interests as well as those of consumers. The relevant question
109. Analogously, the district court in Microsoft found that innovations in the browser
market could improve consumer welfare. Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 49. But the
observation is self-evident, and the court offered no support for its further assertion that
"competitively driven innovations" were most likely to be productive. Id. In any event,
Microsoft did not quash the threat of rival browser innovations.
110. Id. at 17. The court went on to explain as follows:
First, if there are innovations that will make Intel-compatible PC systems
attractive to more consumers, and those consumers less sensitive to the price of
Windows, the innovations will translate into increased profits for Microsoft.
Second, although Microsoft could significantly restrict its investment in
innovation and still not face a viable alternative to Windows for several years, it
can push the emergence of competition even farther into the future by continuing
to innovate aggressively. While Microsoft may not be able to stave off all
potential paradigm shifts through innovation, it can thwart some and delay others
by improving its own products to the greater satisfaction of consumers.
Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
111. See generally LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 90, at 52-56.
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is whether the monopolist has incentives to innovate in ways that, at
the time it is undertaken, predictably will sacrifice consumer welfare.
And there is no basis for concluding that a cable operator has such
incentives. Indeed, it would appear that any imaginable innovation
that would make Internet services more valuable to consumers would
enhance the value of cable modem service.
Some commentators point to the behavior of AT&T, which they
claim resisted any innovation that would threaten its dominance in
the telephone service market. 12 But AT&T is not an apt analogy. To
begin with, the harm to innovation AT&T supposedly caused is not
altogether clear. The relevant question is not simply what products
and services were delayed as a result of its actions. Rather, the
proper question compares two states of the world, one in which
AT&T hampers the development of incompatible products but
develops its own compatible products, and one in which it supports
new incompatible products but pursues a different and potentially
less aggressive program of innovation itself. On balance, AT&T's
conduct may have injured consumers, but that conclusion is not self-
evident. AT&T in fact developed a great many products, and one
would have to ascertain the number and value of the products that
would not have been developed in the relevant "but for" world in
order to infer a net loss to innovation.
AT&T is distinguishable on two other grounds as well. First,
AT&T was a monopolist in several vertically-related markets,
including long distance service, local service, and terminal equipment,
and a high proportion of its costs in all of these markets were sunk."3
In important ways, it was not part of the new economy. Moreover,
the scale of the enterprise was immense. It had more to protect from
paradigm-shifting innovation than does a cable company, which is
smaller and only faces the threat of incompatible innovations in the
provision of Internet services, presumably a market with a much
lower proportion of sunk costs. With less at stake, a cable operator
can be expected to be less resistant to innovations that lead in a new
direction. Second, AT&T had an incentive to avoid regulatory
constraints on its profits, an incentive that a cable operator does not
have. It may have skewed innovation to protect its ability to
circumvent regulation. In all, AT&T may well have been sui generis
in this area as in so many others.
112. See, e.g., Lemley & Lessig, supra note 8, at 9-11.
113. United States v. AT&T Corp., 552 F. Supp. 131, 161-63 (D.D.C. 1982).
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The argument that bundling will distort innovation suffers from
another flaw, which is illuminated by the comparison to AT&T. It
seems to assume incorrectly that a cable ISP would have a monopoly
in a market for innovation in Internet services, which is the relevant
market. AT&T was the only supplier of telephone equipment and
services in the United States, and innovation in the relevant product
markets was likely to be brought about by participants in national
markets, primarily AT&T itself. Similarly, Microsoft has a
commanding share of the international market in operating systems,
though it does not have nearly the freedom from competitive pressure
that the old Bell system enjoyed. But a cable company only has a
monopoly in the provision of cable television service in a local region,
not the market for broadband Internet service innovations. Within its
area, it may well compete for broadband Internet service customers
with DSL ISPs, who have an incentive to innovate unimpaired by the
cable operator.
Just as important, the cable operator is likely to feel competitive
pressure from cable and DSL ISPs outside of its area, each pursuing
its own course of innovation. The concepts of franchise and yardstick
competition are well known in the regulation of public utilities," 4 and
they are pertinent here. Subscribers to a cable company's broadband
Internet services will not be satisfied for long if friends and relatives
in other areas have better services. The cable industry, viewed
nationally, is not excessively concentrated," 5 and there is little reason
to expect every cable company to pursue the same kind of innovation.
Further, ICPs are surely potential competitors in Internet
services markets, and hence innovation competitors. All large ISPs
are already vertically integrated into the Internet content market.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a service offered by an ISP that could
not be obtained by combining simple broadband access with the
service offering resident on an independent ICP's server. No cable
ISP can afford to block its subscribers' access to ICP sites, because
the value of its service is a function of the value to subscribers of
Internet content. Innovations in broadband service offerings by ICPs
are unimpaired by cable bundling. Finally, competition from existing
114. See, e.g., City of Anaheim v. FERC, 941 F.2d 1234, 1243, 1251 (9th Cir. 1991);
Allegheny Elec. Coop., Inc. v. FERC, 922 F.2d 73,77 (2d Cir. 1990).
115. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for the industry based on number of
subscribers in 2000 was about 1200, which is toward the low end of the moderately
concentrated range established in the merger guidelines. Merger Guidelines, supra note
31, § 1.51(b) (data based on Broadcasting & Cable Industry Survey, STANDARD & POOR'S
MONTHLY INVESTMENT REV., July 27,2000).
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but incipient alternative broadband suppliers, such as those using
terrestrial wireless systems and satellites, is likely to intensify. These
firms may not serve as a check on immediate anticompetitive effects,
and so they can properly be excluded from the relevant product
market now. But cable bundling supposedly threatens to inflict
consumer harm in the future, when innovations do not occur, and in
the future-perhaps as soon as the next three to five years-these
firms are likely to represent serious competitive constraints." 6
Conceivably, a cable company might want to prevent innovation
in Internet services not to thwart competition in broadband
transmission or in Internet services, but in some third market in which
it is dominant. For example, suppose video streaming over the
Internet could become a substitute for one-way video services over
cable. The cable company might want to suppress the technology.
But this possibility is so remote that it offers little support for the
regulation of bundling. First, cable already faces competition in the
provision of one-way video services, and so its interest in thwarting
another form of competition is not altogether clear. Second, cable
has no control over DSL or other broadband transmission
technologies, and so if video streaming could become a substitute for
cable television, it could presumably be delivered through one or
more of them. Third, especially in light of the competing means of
broadband transmission, cable companies might well prefer to
embrace the development of video streaming rather than resist it. In
any event, if cable companies do view this emerging technology as a
threat to be thwarted, their optimal strategy would seem to be to alter
the transmission system so that it is incompatible; bundling is largely
irrelevant. Finally, one would think that the service could be
acquired through an ICP, so that any attempt to offer subscribers an
exclusive ISP that did not offer video streaming as a way of
preventing access to it would be futile.
It is worth noting one way in which cable bundling is a greater
potential threat to innovation than the conduct principally at issue in
Microsoft. Microsoft combined its IE browser with other functions of
its operating system and licensed the combination with the
contractual and ultimately technological condition that IE not be
removed or hidden." 7 But OEMs and consumers were free to install
Navigator, as well as any other browser, and Windows is perfectly
116. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
117. See United States v- Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 40-43 (D.D.C. 1999).
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compatible with rival browsers. 118 As a result, Netscape retained the
ability to attract users by making an appreciably better browser than
E. That possibility, in turn, serves as a competitive spur to
Microsoft, which has to innovate to stay ahead of Netscape and other
rivals in the quality of its browser. By contrast, the combination of
cable broadband transmission service and Internet service is a
different kind of bundling. A subscriber is not permitted to use the
services of an independent ISP along with the cable company's
transmission service. 19 This is contractual exclusivity. To the extent
that an ISP is barred from offering services to a particular cable
operator's subscribers, it cannot win new customers among them no
matter how good it makes its service. We explore the significance of
this difference below.
In sum, the threat to consumers from impaired innovation
brought about by cable bundling is modest. But even a modest threat
ought to be avoided if the costs of eliminating it are less than the
expected harm. These costs are a function of the expected value of
the practice to be restrained and the direct costs of implementing the
regulatory solution. We address these issues next.
C. Benefits of Bundling
(1) Integrative and Other Efficiencies
Cable bundling in practice can be divided into two components:
the integration in one firm of broadband transmission and Internet
services, and the refusal to permit independent ISPs to use the cable
company's transmission pipes. As we have already suggested, the
efficiencies of the first component are obvious. Transaction costs can
be reduced by replacing contractual supply arrangements with a
bureaucratic organization. In this market, providing consumers with
the ability to obtain both transmission and Internet services from a
single supplier may offer a significant savings in their transaction
costs. DSL broadband customers, for example, have complained
118. See id. at 89 (noting that "Microsoft did not actually prevent users from obtaining
and using Navigator").
119. There is no uniform terminology in this area, but one could use different terms to
describe the distinctive practices involved. For instance, Klein has distinguished between
three related concepts. Klein, supra note 92. "Tying" can be used to identify a contractual
or technological exclusivity requirement. "Packaging" can refer to the practice of shipping
two items together. "Bundling" then refers to the practice of preventing a user from
removing some part of a package. Under this typology, Microsoft engaged in packaging
and bundling, but not tying. Cable operators, however, engage in packaging and tying.
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about dealing with multiple firms. 120 Sometimes, the benefits of
ownership integration can be realized through exclusive long-term
contracts.' 2' But to the extent that integration poses a competitive
risk, prohibiting one form of integration and not the other would
accomplish little.
The efficiencies associated with the second, or exclusivity,
component of bundling are much less clear, though real efficiencies of
business practices that injure rivals may often be opaque. 22 No
technological barrier prevents a cable company from permitting
independent ISPs to use its transmission system. The consent
agreement requiring AOL Time Warner to provide open access
proves as much. Perhaps cable operators believe that exclusive
control of Internet services will facilitate the process of tailoring the
transmission pipes in ways that are optimal for the provision of
particular services. The implication is that the transmission pipes are
universal now, but they may not be in the future. Of course, this
efficiency argument flies in the face of the e2e principle, because
contrary to that principle, it assumes consumers can benefit when the
middle layer of a network becomes less general. But proponents of
the e2e principle do not and cannot contend that building intelligence
into the transmission pipes is never the most efficient way to provide
some ultimate service. Rather, their claim is that on balance any
sacrifice in efficiency in providing that service is more than offset by
facilitating the delivery of other, perhaps unanticipated services. 123
This judgment may or may not be correct. Any standard excludes. If
VCR manufacturers design cassettes with a maximum recording
capacity of two hours, the producers of three-hour movies will be
disadvantaged. But the consumer benefits of a smaller cassette may
outweigh the advantages of longer recording time. 24
The benefits from optimizing the cable transmission system for
particular Internet services cannot be used to justify bundling,
120. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 29.
121. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 82, at 196-97,201-02.
122. See Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 972, 975 (1986) (asserting that entrepreneurs often do not know why a
practice works, only that it works); Easterbrook, supra note 79, at 5-6 (observing that a
business is unlikely to have a good explanation for its success).
123. For example, Lemley and Lessig state, "[l]ower-level network layers should
provide a broad range of resources that are not particular to or optimized for any single
application-even if a more efficient design for at least some applications is thereby
sacrificed." Lemley & Lessig, supra note 8, at 6.
124. For a fascinating economic discussion of the battle between the Beta and VHS
video recording standards, see LIEBOwITz & MARGOLIS, supra note 90, at 120-27.
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however, unless they depend on exclusivity. And without exclusivity,
indeed without integration, a cable operator could still have the
incentive and would have the ability to alter its transmission system to
the advantage of particular ISPs. But perhaps the cable company
would confront opposition from disadvantaged ISPs, which it would
prefer to avoid. The process of optimization might function more
smoothly if independent ISPs are uninvolved. This explanation,
however, is not especially compelling.
Another possibility is that cable bundling reduces the costs to
consumers of identifying the responsible party when their service
fails. As DSL customers have found, determining the culpable
supplier when multiple parties provide different parts of the ultimate
service can be vexatious.'25 The cable operator has an interest in
avoiding the loss of goodwill it might suffer if consumers blame it for
service failures caused by an independent ISP12 6 This possible
efficiency does require exclusivity. But again the explanation is not
overwhelming.
Perhaps the explanation has to do with price discrimination. As
noted earlier, it is not obvious to us how cable bundling could be a
method of price discrimination, but we cannot dismiss the possibility.
If it is, its immediate allocative effects would be indeterminate, but it
would increase the profits of the cable operator. These profits may
be invested in the development of the service or the building out of
the system, thereby benefiting consumers in the long run. This
explanation reasonably assumes that the cable operator would earn
less profit by charging a monopoly price for unbundled transmission
service than by bundling. Whether the additional return leads to
socially excessive investment is a separate question, one that cannot
confidently be answered.
Once again, Microsoft offers a fruitful comparison. The
integration of IE into the operating system produced efficiencies. 127
Non-browser related functions share files with browser functionality,
and the operating system works better because it can call upon those
files. The services used in Internet browsing can be called upon by
125. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 29.
126. This is one of the standard explanations of tying. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 84, at
379-81.
127. See William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, The Dubious Search for "Integration" in
the Microsoft Trial, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1251, 1255-58 (1999). Even the district court found
that "many-if not most-consumers can be said to benefit from Microsoft's provision of
Web browsing functionality with its Windows operating system at no additional charge."
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 46 (D.D.C. 1999).
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applications through application programming interfaces (APIs), thus
eliminating the need to include those services in each application.
The integration therefore creates an efficient and stable platform for
independent software vendors (ISVs), and thereby increases the
variety of applications available for consumers.128 Consumers also
enjoy the convenience of obtaining browser functionality
automatically with the purchase of an operating system.
The specific practice challenged, however, was not the act of
integration, but the refusal to allow IE to be deleted or hidden from
consumers, and so it is the efficiency of that practice that is at issue.129
Certainly removal of the files that constitute IE would destroy the
efficiencies of integration; removal is the antithesis of integration.
For example, because files are shared, the operating system would not
work if all files used for web browsing were deleted, and Windows
would no longer represent a dependable and uniform platform for
ISVs. 30 Merely hiding IE from end users represents less of a threat
to these efficiencies than does removal of the files, but the threat is
nevertheless real.131 The necessary modifications to Windows, which
would not be fully implemented by Microsoft, might have posed some
risk to the functional integrity of the operating system. More
importantly, Microsoft's primary interest was in preventing OEMs
128. For example, Stan Liebowitz estimated that the porting costs for software
developers associated with a breakup of Windows into three competing operating systems
would be at least $30 billion dollars over a three-year period, and he did not attempt to
quantify other costs. Stan J. Liebowitz, Breaking Windows: Estimating the Cost of
Breaking up Microsoft Windows, 32 UWLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
129. Microsoft, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 46 ("No consumer benefit can be ascribed, however, to
Microsoft's refusal... to provide a method for uninstalling Internet Explorer from
Windows 98."). The court also found that Microsoft could have marketed two versions of
Windows, one with IE and one without. Id at 46-47. But that marketing strategy surely
would have fragmented the Windows platform.
130. The district court suggested that the efficiencies of a uniform platform would be
preserved because independent software producers could include in their programs
whatever Microsoft removed from Windows. Id at 48. But such a response is patently
less efficient than having the services needed for a multiplicity of applications written once
and resident on the operating system. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Devising a
Microsoft Remedy that Serves Consumers, GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2001).
131. The district court in Microsoft drew a distinction between merely hiding IE on the
one hand and preventing IE from being invoked by deleting only browser-specific code on
the other. See Microsoft, 65 F. Supp.2d at 46. The latter option would not, by hypothesis,
disable the operating system because no shared files would be deleted. But this is merely
a semantic difference. An overwhelming proportion of the code necessary for browsing
functionality would remain on the system, and deleting the rest of the code, even if that in
fact is technologically feasible, in order to prevent browsing is tantamount to hiding the
browser.
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from hiding IE.132 Consumers, who were always permitted to install
Navigator and use it instead of IE,133 would surely derive no benefit
from having convenient access to IE disabled, when all of the
functionality of IE remained on the operating system. Yet OEMs
could profit by selling to another firm the exclusive right to have its
browser displayed on the desktop. In reality, Microsoft was paying
OEMs for the right, by charging relatively lower royalty rates, not to
have IE excluded from the desktop, a transaction that presumptively
benefited consumers.
(2) Avoided Costs of Regulation
An implicit benefit of permitting bundling of cable modem and
Internet services is that it avoids the direct and indirect costs of
regulation. These costs depend on the kind of regulation imposed,
and two fundamental kinds of regulatory mandates are available:
integration is forbidden, or integration is permitted but open access is
required. Integrative efficiencies forgone are likely to be substantial
under the first approach, and a regulation that permits integration but
requires open access will unavoidably entail high administrative costs,
particularly in the determination of an appropriate price of access,
under the second. The price provisions of the AOL/Time Warner
consent order illustrate some of these potential costs.
The prices AOL Time Warner can charge independent ISPs for
use of its cable system are not directly regulated under the consent
order. Certainly the competitive benefits of compelled access
disappear if the cable company can set rates for transmission services
that are too high to allow independent ISPs to compete for
subscribers with AOL and Road Runner. The FTC addresses this
problem obliquely. First, it requires AOL Time Warner to grant
unaffiliated ISPs prices as low as it negotiates with other major cable
operators for AOL or Road Runner Internet service provided over
their systems.M This assumes, of course, that other major cable
systems do not insist on providing broadband Internet services solely
through their own ISPs, contrary to the central premise of many who
object to cable bundling. Put this aside, as well as the provision's
invitation to act strategically in selecting other cable systems and
negotiating contract terms with them. If ownership integration of
132. Microsoft never prohibited OEMs from pre-installing Navigator. Id. at 54.
133. Id. at 89 ("Microsoft did not actually prevent users from obtaining and using
Navigator .... ").
134. Decision and Order, supra note 11, § II.C.1.
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broadband transmission and Internet services is uniquely efficient,
then even a cost-based rate for transmission charged to an
unaffiliated ISP will not permit that firm to offer subscribers a
package price as low as the price the affiliated ISP can offer.135 The
unaffiliated ISPs will founder. If AOL becomes the exclusive ISP on
other major cable systems, and it negotiates rates that reflect
efficiencies of long-term contractual integration, then those rates are
an improper standard for short-run transactions with multiple
unaffiliated ISPs on the AOL Time Warner system that do not offer
comparable efficiencies. At best, because the costs of transmission
can vary across cable systems, the standard is flawed.
Second, the FTC approved the contract between Time Warner
and Earthlink negotiated before the merger. 36 The rates specified in
that contract became the reference point for contracts with other
ISPs. But that contract may reflect Time Warner's desire to win the
FTC's approval more than it does an arms-length commercial deal.
Its utility as a competitive benchmark is questionable.
Rates for cable broadband transmission service are generally
unregulated, though they are constrained by the price of DSL service
where available. To the extent the cable operator has monopoly
power, it will exploit it one way or another. There are three
possibilities. First, if it bundles transmission and Internet services, it
will charge subscribers a monopoly price for the package. Second, if
it is allowed to offer a package of services to consumers but is also
required to sell transmission services separately to independent ISPs,
it can charge ISPs a monopoly price, and it has the ability to charge a
price calculated to exclude them from the market. In effect, it could
place independent ISPs in a "price squeeze." To prevent strategic
pricing of this kind by requiring the cable operator to charge
independent ISPs the same rates it charges itself is an artificial and
potentially inefficient approach. The transfer price of an input
between two units of a single enterprise may be an arbitrary number,
and if it reflects efficiencies associated with the integration, it is also
an improper standard for arms-length transactions. The cable
operator could be forced to sell transmission services at incremental
cost, but Congress apparently did not intend to hold cable companies
to this standard, and such a standard would be inappropriate anyway.
135. This assumes that the unaffiliated ISP is no more efficient in the provision of
Internet services apart from transmission. If it is more efficient, AOL would hardly
dominate the narrowband access market.
136. See Decision and Order, supra note 11, § II.A.1. The Earthlink contract was
signed on November 18,2000. Id. at § I.Y.
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An investment in upgrading a cable system to provide broadband
capability entails risk, and an operator will have little incentive to
invest unless it can charge a price for broadband transmission service
that compensates it for that risk.137 In any event, unless cable
companies are to be trusted to avoid strategic pricing, ongoing, direct
supervision under some price standard will be required, a horrific
prospect the FTC wisely tried to avoid.
The last alternative is to confine the cable company to the
provision of transmission services and require it to sell to all comers
at non-discriminatory rates. But this solution threatens to increase
prices to consumers by prohibiting the realization of integrative
efficiencies. As Coase famously pointed out, the decision to produce
inputs internally identifies the boundaries of the economic entity
known as a "firm."138 The third alternative thus tampers with the
fundamental mechanism by which efficiencies are achieved, the
formation of firms.
Our analysis does imply that the relatively young age of the
broadband industry is significant in assessing the propriety of
government intervention. The analysis compares the competitive
threat posed by cable bundling to the cost of intervention. One of the
reasons the competitive threat is insubstantial is that various methods
of broadband transmission are competing with each other, today
principally cable, DSL, and fixed wireless, with satellite farther
behind. There is no technological standard. If in the future cable
comes to dominate, the calculus changes, and to that extent some
kind of regulatory response might be appropriate. We will not
speculate on whether intervention would then be justified and what
precise form it might take. If cable broadband transmission did
become the dominant standard, however, a prohibition on bundling
would still seem to be an inappropriate response. A cable company
could not anticompetitively leverage its transmission power into the
Internet services market, and ISPs would not threaten to erode the
cable firm's monopoly power in transmission through innovation. An
effective response would have to regulate transmission prices. In any
event, the possibility of a different industry structure sometime in the
future does not warrant regulatory action today.
137. See Jorde, supra note 51, at 14-17 (arguing that requiring phone companies to sell
unbundled network elements at prices set on the basis of total element long-run
incremental cost adversely affects incentives to invest in facilities).
138. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386,386 (1937).
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D. Summary
Comparing cable bundling to Microsoft's bundling highlights
four important differences. First, the kind of innovation at risk in
Microsoft was more specific and significant than that at issue in cable
bundling. The innovation allegedly retarded in Microsoft had the
potential of destroying Microsoft's platform monopoly. By contrast,
cable bundling allegedly impairs innovation in the provision of
Internet services, but there is no credible reason to think that
innovation in the platform, or transmission services, market is
affected. Second, the scope of the impact is greater in Microsoft than
in cable bundling. In Microsoft, the relevant market in innovation
was roughly coincident with Microsoft's service market. It was world-
wide. But in cable bundling, any market power a cable operator has
is local, whereas the market in innovation is at least national. Third,
the kind of bundling at issue in Microsoft was less inherently exclusive
than that involved in the cable industry, and to that extent less
dangerous. Microsoft's bundling did not prevent consumers from
using an alternative browser with Windows if they so preferred. By
contrast, a cable company prohibits a subscriber from using a rival
ISP in conjunction with its transmission service. Finally, the bundling
in Microsoft more clearly benefited consumers. Microsoft's bundling
stimulated the development of desirable applications and guaranteed
consumers easy access to a product many valued. Cable bundling
may benefit consumers in both the short and long term, but the
benefits are less tangible.
In general, we believe that, given the relative competence of the
market and regulatory institutions in promoting consumer welfare,
the government presumptively should not intervene when a practice
generates obvious and immediate consumer benefits but poses an
indistinct threat to innovation. In Microsoft, the potential loss from
impaired innovation was significant, but the immediate benefits of the
practice were demonstrably substantial, and we see nothing to rebut
the presumption that intervention was unwarranted. In cable
bundling, the consumer benefits are more obscure than in Microsoft,
but the threat from stifled innovation is less serious. In such a case,
the cost of intervention becomes an especially important
consideration. A remedy that destroys the efficiencies of integrating
transmission and Internet services, such as one that prohibits a cable
operator from offering Internet services, would be dramatically
disproportionate to the risk to innovation. A remedy that permits
integration but requires open access poses the prospect of
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extraordinary administrative costs. On balance, we would leave cable
bundling to the market.139
Conclusion
The foundation of a sound competition policy is the welfare of
consumers. A cable company's practice of bundling broadband
transmission and Internet services causes consumers no immediate
harm. But some argue that it will impose future consumer injury by
deterring innovation. The threat of impaired innovation has become
a common justification for intervention in markets. A risk to
innovation should be taken seriously in the formulation of public
policy, but a claim that innovation is threatened cannot become some
kind of a trump card, cutting off all further play. Economists do not
fully understand the process of innovation or the conditions that
promote optimal invention. Stripped bare, an assertion of impeded
innovation is often a claim that innovation will proceed down a path
the critic disfavors, not that it will cease or even decline. That claim
itself implies an uncertain trade-off in consumer welfare, and
whatever its merits, the prospect of future injury must be balanced
against any immediate consumer benefits. In a competitive market,
where business practices hurt rivals, who are always potential
innovators, uncritical deference to claims of impaired innovation can
subvert consumer welfare. Though a threat to innovation from cable
bundling cannot be dismissed, it is not sufficiently serious to justify
regulation.
139. Professor Speta reaches a similar conclusion, but for somewhat different reasons.
See Speta, supra note 7, at 87. He finds that the prevalence of direct network
externalities-what we would call network effects-justifies the imposition of open access
requirements on traditional telecommunications networks, but that the indirect network
externalities that characterize broadband platforms eliminate the need for compulsory
open access. We are not convinced that the distinction between direct and indirect
network effects supports a difference in regulatory approach, and a decision not to impose
open access on cable broadband service providers is justified by more than the existence of
indirect network effects.
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